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Abstract: Contemporary theories of justice may be categorized in mainly po-
litical and natural justice theories. The former are generally conceived as an
instance of the Kantian philosophical tradition, whereas the latter are rooted
in classical-philosophy theories. Fach of them is furthermore grounded on a
different conception of the person: "political", or "ontological". This paper
aims to bring them in rapport, taking in special account Martha Nussbaum's
and Sergio Cotta' s justice theories. The paper argues that the universal respect
of individuals' rights -which is at the core of Nussbaum's theory- finds better
support in Cotta's onto-phenomenological approach to justice, rather than in
Rawls'political liberalism.
Contents: 1. From a "partially comprehensive" to a "political" conception of
the person, 2. Some theoretical and practical limitations of Nussbaum's "politi-
cal" conception of the person, 3. An "ontological" definition of the person, 4.
Human capabilities within Cotta's "onto-phenomenological" approach.
* An extended version of this paper was originally presented at the HDCA
Conference, "Ideas Changing History", New York, September 17-20, 2007. The
HDCA Association, headed by Martha Nussbaum, and founded by the Nobel
Prize for Economy, Amartya Sen, aims at furthering the study of human develo-
pment and capabilities, by bringing together scholars from different disciplines
and countries. Whilst this explains the present paper focus on Nussbaum's po-
litical conception of the person, the choice to endeavour in a comparison with
Sergio Cotta's onto-phenomenological approach derives from my personal com-
mitment to his school of thought.
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1. FROM A "PARTIALLY COMPREHENSIVE" TO A "POLITICAL"
CONCEPTION OF THE PERSON
Since her endorsement of a Rawlsian type of political liberal-
ism, Nussbaum proposes to ground norms on a "political", rather
than a "partially comprehensive" conception of the person (Nuss-
baum 2000). The same concept could be conveyed, in terms more
familiar to the legal scientist, with the word "juridical person". In
fact, like the most widespread use of this word -which refers to
an abstract, artificial subject given relevance to, or brought into
existence by law- the "political" conception of the person refers
to the citizen, or the rights' bearer, whose identity is socially con-
strued. More specifically, it is by means of a Rawlsian type of
overlapping political consensus that the identity of the citizen, or
its relevant fundamental capabilities, are determined (Nussbaum
2006, p. 70)'.
On the other hand, "comprehensive" conceptions of the person,
for realists at least, refer to the pre-political or 'real' identity of
living individuals instead^ That is to the identity of the individual
as he, or she, really is: an identity which needs of course to be
known and acknowledged by reason, but not created ex-novo, so to
speak, by public consensus. Since Nussbaum has always defended
the idea that it may not be possible to know the person as he, or
she, really is -our public scrutiny being limited to the sorting out
of 'appearances' (Nussbaum 1986)- by comprehensive conception
of the person she means to refer to what we think a person really
is. This explains why "comprehensive" conceptions of the person
-being in her view comparable to Kant's 'internal', mental phe-
nomena- differ and change with people's points of view. Whereas
she initially partakes for the possibility of arriving to a shared "par-
1. See Appendix for the complete list.
2. What in legal terms would be defined the "natural person".
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tially comprehensive" conception of the person -which constitutes
a sort of medium-point amongst different 'internal', comprehen-
sive conceptions of the person- she recently drops this conception
with her endorsement of a Rawlsian type of political liberalism.
In fact, she has recently matured the conviction that the "com-
prehensive" conceptions of the person are not only mental 'ar-
tefacts' but they are also inherently incommensurable, so that
they can not constitute -unlike the "political" person which is
the object of consensus^ a legitimate, or shared basis for rights
claims (Deneulin 2002). Some classical, comprehensive defini-
tions of the person are, for instance, a "being created in God's
image", the "self-agent subject", an "individual substance of ra-
tional nature", etc. Unarguably different, these essentialist defi-
nitions may nonetheless be regarded by philosophers belonging
to the metaphysical tradition as commensurable, if only for the
fact that they all converge in identifying the "natural" person, or
living, real individual, with the member of the human species
(Cotta 1989, p. 76).
2. SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF NUSSBAUM'S
"POLITICAL" CONCEPTION OF THE PERSON
Not everyone would share Nussbaum's hope that the "political"
conception of the person could gather wide and critical support.
Rawls himself admits that the capabilities he deems important for
one to be considered part of civil society (particularly the capacity
to reason and to follow one's conception of the good) are widely
accepted as reasonable only in liberal democracies where the
values of individual freedom and rationality are already embedded
in the culture and the Constitution (Rawls 1996). According to
Rawls, they would not stand the test of open and critical scrutiny
in countries such as, to cite a few, China, India, and the rest of
Asia. (Nussbaum 2006; Sen 2004).
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To these hypothetical objections of his, Nussbaum replies that
1) capabilities and freedoms flow from the universal, intuitive,
values of human dignity and sociability, two "freestanding ethi-
cal claims out of which one might build a political conception of
the person" (Nussbaum 2006, p. 36) and that 2) even in countries,
such as China, "where there is not yet a liberal constitutional de-
mocracy (...) there are also long-standing seeds of such ideas",
like human rights and human dignity (Nussbaum 2006, p. 304).
These clarifications, though, are not sufficient to explain and
demonstrate the possibility of a long-standing practical consensus
based only on the twin ideas of sociability and human dignity.
The example of China is paramount: although present in seed, the
notion of human dignity has not yet given rise to a consensus on
the values of universal central human capabilities as conceived by
Nussbaum. Dignity and rights (or capabilities) are only attributed
to some members of civil society and not others. Women and baby
girls are considered 'inferior' or 'less dignified' than baby boys if
we consider the common practice of killing baby girls at birth for
want of a male, family heir. Furthermore, even the former rights'
are often limited and conditional to the individual abidance to the
principles ofthe socialist regime (Corradini 1984).
The problem with the idea of human dignity -from which Nuss-
baum suggests to derive her political conception of the person- is
its indefiniteness. As Putnam points out, it is an idea of Judaeo-
Christian origin (Putnam 1991) that Nussbaum takes from Grozio,
without sharing his justification or metaphysical grounding (Nuss-
baum 2006, p. 36). In some passages it is vaguely defined as what
makes a human being an end (Nussbaum 2006, p. 36), or as that
in which good human functioning consist of (Nussbaum 2001,
p. 120). But what good human functioning is, or what makes a
human being an end, is intentionally (at least since Nussbaum's
endorsement of political liberalism) left undefined. To advance a
definition of what good human functioning consists in amounts to
imposing a comprehensive, and thus parochial, conception of the
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good (Nussbaum 2006, p. 182). So the passage from the two free-
standing ethical claims of human dignity and sociability to the list
of human capabilities is left unexplained. We are left wondering
why people and nations otherwise divided by their religious, or
comprehensive doctrines, would accept unanimously (after serious
rational scrutiny) the political conception of the person. Even if it
were the case that people from all over the world do in fact accept
this conception, its ubiquity would not by itself provide a good
argument for its universal normative acceptability.
Furthermore, the "political" conception of the person is not in-
clusive of all human life forms. It is true that, unlike Rawls', Nuss-
baum's "political" person is characterized by the Aristotelian ca-
pacity to establish relationships, and includes potential (rather than
only actual) capabilities. Nonetheless, this capacity -like all oth-
ers contained in the list- are empirical, or contingent (Nussbaum
1988, p. 169) being not only actually but also potentially absent in
the same individual at different times. Not all individuals manifest
or will ever show the capacity to feel compassion for, or joy, at the
presence of their caregivers. The result is that some individuals are
left out from political membership, and the rights which follow. It
would have been different, were the free-standing ethical notion of
sociability (from which the capability to relate to others is derived)
defined from the beginning to the end\ as an ontological, intrinsic
or structural characteristic of the human being, rather than -for in-
stance- as the "impelling desire for fellowship" (Nussbaum 2006,
p. 36). In such case, the human being would have been depicted as
sociable just for the fact of being bom from human parents, and de-
pending for his physical and psychological life from the existence of
3. There are passages where Nussbaum seems to adhere to this ontologi-
cal indent notion of sociability -describing the human being as both needy and
dependent- but apparently she does not seem to apply it consistently, excluding
some individuals (i.e. the anencephaiic child, and the person in a persistent veg-
etative state) from human-species membership.
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Others (Cotta 1992, pp. 31-32). In some passages, Nussbaum seems
to consider human sociability just in this light, by defining human
beings as "temporal animal beings who begin as babies and end, of-
ten, in other forms of dependency" (Nussbaum 2006, p. 160). None-
theless, she does not seemingly apply this meaning consistently, as
we will see in the examples which follow.
If Jamie (bom with down syndrome), Arthur (who has a type
of high functioning autism) and Sesha (a mentally retarded young
woman) are justly considered equal citizens, despite their inability
to either develop high levels of reasoning, or social skills (Nuss-
baum 2006, pp. 96-97), this is not the case of the "anencephaiic
child" or "the person in a persistent vegetative state" (Nussbaum
2006, p. 187), given their inability to feel or show minimal levels
of consciousness, gratitude and affection. But -we may object-
they also live in a human body, and are dependent, or needy,
as all the rest of the people at specific moments of their life (a
characteristic of human dignity which, as anticipated, she applies
only to some individuals, and not others). Furthermore, they may
own intentionality and be self-conscious, even though they are not
able to manifest these capacities and suffer from brain damage
(Spaemann 2006)"*. If we trace a line of demarcation between them
and the other human beings, or disabled persons, it may be pos-
sible that we soon end up discriminating - on the basis of an in-
determinate conception of human dignity, and a contingent type
of sociability - people with Alzheimer disease, or epilepsy, just to
cite a few examples. We would embark in the so called "slippery
slope", on behalf of which once we take a first step towards the
exclusion of certain individuals from citizenship, it will be easier
to take further steps in the same direction (D'Agostino, 2004).
4. Intentionality and self-consciousness, as we will argue, are not empirical
capacities which may be perceived through sight, touch, and the other external
senses. They do not necessarily depend for their existence on the brain, even
though they manifest themselves in the activities of the brain.
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It must reckoned that Nussbaum has modified previous state-
ments, "which might have been read to suggest that if any one of
the capabilities is totally cut off, the life is no longer a human life"
(Nussbaum 2006, p. 432). She now specifies that "if enough of
them are impossible (...) we may judge that the life is not a human
life at all, any more" (Nussbaum 2006, p. 181). Nonetheless, Nuss-
baum leaves unspecified who and why should decide how many
and which capabilities failures are enough to consider someone
not a person anymore. She only sets the extreme threshold after
which a life is not human anymore, close to the medical definition
of death (Nussbaum 2006, p. 181), overlooking the fact there is
more that one medical definition of death and, more importantly,
the fact that medical definitions of death do rest on specific philo-
sophical, and comprehensive conceptions ofthe person (Palazzani
2002, 183-200). So to abide to a medical definition of death is
identical with espousing, intentionally or unintentionally, a spe-
cific notion of who a person really is.
Furthermore, the change in the definition of personhood endorsed
by Nussbaum is quantitative, not qualitative. A more radical change
would be needed to guarantee the rights of all living individuals. A
change, that is, which leads to the identification of personhood with
biological membership in the human species (Spaemann 2006, p.
80). An identification which in tum rests on a non-dualistic concep-
tion of the mind-body relation, and a non materialistic conception
of the mind (which does not reduce the mind to the brain and its
cerebral functions), both features of an "ontological" conception of
the person, that we will start to illustrate in the following paragraph.
Only this sort of identification would be able to explain what in
some places Nussbaum defines (without consistently applying it)
the dignity of our animal body, or bodily need (Nussbaum 2006, p.
160). In fact, the ontological definition of the person -albeit seem-
ingly abstract- brings to the forefront the intrinsic value of the hu-
man body and may itself be derived from an a-posteriori investiga-
tion of human agency (Palazzani 1996, p. 237).
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3. AN "ONTOLOGICAL" DEFINITION OF THE PERSON
In a very general sense, ontology refers to the "science of
being" (Putnam 2004, p. 17), or to the study of "what there re-
ally is" as opposed to what seems to be, or appears to us imme-
diately in perception. External, contingent properties -like shape,
colour, or size of objects- may be referred to as 'appearances', in
the sense that they do not constitute an object/or subject intrinsic
identity, but are nonetheless immediately perceived by our senses.
On the other hand, "what there really is" corresponds to what re-
mains the same throughout an object/subject's changing proper-
ties. Within this very broad definition of ontology, at least two dif-
ferent approaches to the study of being are identifiable: an a-priori
investigation which starts from an analysis of Forms, or principles
(and which has for some been erroneously ascribed to Plato); and
an a-posteriori study of being, which takes its start from an analy-
sis of linguistic practices and human agency (Maclntyre 1990). If
the first kind of approach may be considered "inflationary" (Put-
nam 2004, p. 17), or dogmatic, as it presupposes a "God's Eye
point of view" (Putnam 1981, p. 50); the second kind of ontologi-
cal approach assumes that we can only have access to "what there
really is" through the study of phenomena, things perceptible to
the senses. For this reason it has been defined as an "ontophenom-
enological" approach (Cotta, 1991). It is this second approach that
we will now take into consideration, as it applies to the concept of
the person, or to "who a person really is".
The first philosopher who has engaged in what Cotta' defines
an "onto-phenomenological" analysis -even though naming "di-
alectical" its approach- is, according to some interpreters, Aris-
5. Sergio Cotta (1921-2007), one ofthe most prominent contemporary Italian
philosophers of the law, has taught for several years at the University "La Sa-
pienza" (Rome). Furthermore, he has been Director ofthe "Rivista Internazionale
di Filosofia del Diritto" and President of the Italian Union of Catholic Lawyers.
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totle. For him, we may "advance to the more intelligible" -that is
to things, as they really are in themselves- by focusing on "what
is less intelligible by nature" - that is on those very things that
appear to us immediately, in perception (Wians 1992; Aristotle,
Metaph VII 3,1029b3-12). As it applies to the study of living be-
ings, Aristotle's epistemological method suggests that we begin
with the study of their capacities, or potentialities (Finnis 1995),
which in turn point to what they are in themselves, that is to their
essence, cause, or actuality. In fact, "animals do not (have the
capacity to) see in order that they may have sight, but they have
sight that they may see. And similarly men have the art of build-
ing that they may (have the capacity to) build, and theoretical
science that they may (have the capacity to) theorize; but they do
not theorize (have the capacity to theorize) that they may have
theoretical science (...)" (Aristotle, Metaph IX 8, 1050al0-15).
Human beings' actuality, essence, real being -or ontological na-
ture- explains their actions, movements and behaviour. Potency
(capability) can only derive from actuality, and not the other way
around.
We could not even say "I was born on such a day of such
year", if our self or personal identity were reduced to its mani-
festations, or only came into being at a certain moment of our
life's existence (at the outset of our capacities, for instance, or at
the moment of their brain full development) (Spaemann 2006).
That is why for Aristotle, the essence, or soul, of man* may be
defined as that which is beyond those human qualities, capabili-
ties, or brain activities, perceptible to the senses'', with that which
6. Here and elsewhere in this paper, the word 'man' refers to both females
and males belonging to the human species.
7. In some of Aristotle's works, the essence of man is identified with the
soul, in others with the unity of soul and body. The apparent contradiction may
be solved by showing that the body enters Aristotle's essentialist definition of
man only insofar as it is a condition of the soul's manifest expression.
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remains the same through all changes, and may be referred to, in
modern language, with the concept of man's constitutive identi-
ty, as opposed to his contingent, or constituted identity (Romera
2005, p. 109).
In order to explain the passage from the empirical capabili-
ties to the ontological and metaphysical essence of living beings,
it may be helpful to refer to the concept of eidetic intuition, or
"eidesis", first used by Husserl (the founder of phenomenology).
Like Aristotle, Husserl believes that the discernment of living be-
ings' essences requires some sort of 'reduction', or 'purification'
of experience. We imaginatively eliminate from our definitions,
those properties without which an object, or living being, can still
remain the same (Sokolowsky 2000). In the case of the sphere,
for instance, we are able to say that bronze is not part of its es-
sence, and "that sphericity can be realized in many different sorts
of matter". Likewise, the essence of a lion can be obtained by
eliminating its shape, size, or colour. Lions may be essentially de-
fined as animals which need meat, "that they are proud and strong,
that when they are hungry they take great risks to attack sheep-
folds (...)" (Nussbaum 1978, pp. 71-72).
Aristotle, as we have seen, would define the human being by
reference to the soul, or ontological self. Man's ontological self,
or constitutive identity, is that in which resides the equal dignity
of individuals, otherwise so different in needs and capabilities,
and may offer a more satisfactory basis, than the political concep-
tion of the person, for the idea of human rights' universal owner-
ship. The ontological definition of the person, however, makes
use of concepts such as substance, essence and soul that, being
metaphysical, Nussbaum may find divisive (Nussbaum 2006,
p. 182). Hopefully, we have already started to show that even
though comprehensive, and indeed metaphysical, the ontological
definition of the person is not ideological, or parochial. Besides
being a common heritage of different cultures, the concept of the
soul is deduced from an "eidetic analysis" of human practices and
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existence (including man's capabilities): not from an apriori, self-
evident truth, of the sort Nussbaum -and Putnam- rightly fear we
can have no rational knowledge oP.
4. HUMAN CAPABILITIES wrraiN COTTA'S "ONTO-PHENOMENOLOGICAL"
APPROACH
In different works, Sergio Cotta endeavours to derive an on-
tological definition of the person from what we have previously
defined, following Husserl, an "eidetic analysis" of legal customs.
In fact, Cotta notes, there is no country where some form of legal
regulation is absent. In particular, there are some legal customs
which, despite the specific content they take in different cultures,
are, in their core structure, common to humankind (and thus cor-
respond to what Roman stoics used to call ius gentium). In all
cultures, for instance, there are forms of legal-property (public,
private, social, or personal); legal-associations (private, public,
financial, political or cultural); inheritance of material or spiri-
tual goods (like one's surname); and judicial settlement practices
(Cotta 1992, p. 23)^ Furthermore, all these manifest, or point to
the existence of common needs, such as the need for stability, or
duration in time (of one's family name, goods, activities); the need
8. It is important not to identify the concept of rationality with the concept
of exact knowledge ofthe mathematical, deductive type. We can have a rational
apprehension of something (the soul), even though we may not be able to grasp
it either empirically, or deductively.
9. To these, Francesco D'Agostino (1996, pp. 249-269) -renown disciple
of Cotta- adds the universal prohibitions on homicide, incest and cannibalism,
whose universality has been brought to the front by the work of cultural anthro-
pologists like Levy Strauss, Arens and Gouldner. Their existence points to the
relational character of human beings, who need to coexist peacefully in order to
prosper and develop their own being.
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for security (in an impartial judgement); the need for assistance
from others (in the pursuit of common objectives) and so on (Cot-
ta 1992, p. 24).
At a second glance, applying "eidetic analysis" further, these
legal practices reveal other, essential, or properly ontological di-
mensions of man. The need for assistance, for instance, points to
one's finitude. For if man's capabilities or potentialities -in under-
standing, in action, in judgement and being (Cotta, 1992, p. 26)-
were not finite, one would not need the assistance of others. In the
second place, we have mortatity: if one did not live in a mortal,
fragile body and were not self-conscious of his, or her mortality,
one would not feel the need, or desire for stability and duration.
One would rather rest content and live in an ethereal condition
like the Gods, or else live unconsciously like the animals. Further-
more, one would not turn to the law in order to overcome, or tran-
scend, his/her weaknesses and thus counterbalance the risks one's
finitude exposes him/her to (Cotta 1992, p 27). Likewise, the need
for help and assistance points to others' inescapable presence and
to man's relational character (sociabitity).
To Nussbaum's readers, the resemblance between her "politi-
cal" conception ofthe person and Cotta's "ontological" definition
of the person may appear striking. While finitude, mortality, self-
consciousness and sociability are shared by Nussbaum's "politi-
cal person", they take a different meaning in Cotta. First of all,
they are rooted in men's objective, and 'external needs' or desires
rather than on a free-standing, wide, reflective equilibrium. In
the second place, Cotta recognizes that man's self-consciousness
-which is really distinctive of man and not of other nonhuman ani-
mals- has a metaphysical, rather than an empirical nature. In the
sense that it is not measurable or perceivable through the senses
(like the capacity to care for, or to manipulate the environment,
for instance), but only through self-reflection (D'Agostino, 2006,
p. 103). For this reason, it may not be reduced to the empirical
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dimensions of the brain either'". Rather it may well be identified
with man's soul.
From such conclusions -in particular, from the metaphysical
definition of selfconsciousness, and the definition of man as the
unity of body (finitude) and soul- Cotta recognizes that all indi-
viduals belonging to the human species, have a dignity. Thus, they
are rights' bearers (Cotta, 1989), even though they do not exhibit
any of their contingent, or empirical, capabilities. He is thus able
to include in the ontological conception of the person, those indi-
viduals, like the severely disabled, who are left out from juridical
consideration by Nussbaum's political conception of justice and
the person.
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APPENDIX
The central human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2006, pp 76-77)
1. Life. Being- able to live to the end of a human life of normal
length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced
as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including re-
productive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate
shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place;
to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and
domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction
and for choice in matters of reproduction.
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses,
to imagine, think, and reason - and to do these things in a "truly
human" way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate edu-
cation, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic
mathematical and scientific training (...).
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to
grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experi-
ence longing, gratitude, and justified anger (...).
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life.
7. Affiliation.
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a) Being able to live with and towards others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various
forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation
of another (...).
b) Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation
to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over One's Environment.
a) Being able to participate effectively in political choices that
govern one's life; having the right of political participation,
protections of free speech and association.
b) Being able to hold property (...).

